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CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
Public poli c',- requires that everyT man shall be at liberty
to work for himself and shall not be at liberty to deprive
himself or the state of his labor, skill or talent, by any
contract into 'hich he may enter. 'o put forth every effort
for the accomplishment of useful ends and the happiness of
himself and those dependent upon him is his mission and des-
tiny. he is compelled by necessity which is the law of his
being, to utilize and exercise his faculties and powers to
procure shelter, food and raiment and it is only by a contin-
uous struggle and in consequence of repeated failures and §,is-
takes that he can hope to become an intelligent, self-reliant
and morally responsible me:-ber of society. The law being
cognizant of these facts and ever watchful for the welfare
of the state, has thrown the arm of protection about them to
ward off the attacks of designing men, who are ever on the
alert to take advantage of improvident persons, who for slight
temporary gain could be persuaded to relinquish the usual
vocations which afforded them a means of livelihood and would
ultimately become a public charge.
On the other hand, public policy requires that when a
man has, by skill, or br any other means, obtained sonething
which he wishes to sell, he should be at liberty to sell it
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advantageously in the market, and in order to accomplish this
desired result, he should be at liberty to preclude himself
from eritering into competition with the purchaser. The abil-
ity of the poor man to earn a livelihood lies in the strength
and dexterity of his own hands. To hinder the employment
of this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks prop-
er, or to prevent its sale in the market where the greatest
returns may be had, is a manifest encroachment upon the just
liberty both of the workman and those who might wish to nego-
tiate with him and will not be tolerated by public policy.
Hence public policy does not rebtrain him from alienating that
which he wishes to alienate, but enables him to enter into
any stipulation, however restricted it is, provided that
restrjction in the judgment of the court is not unreasonable,
having regard to the subject matter of the contract.
These briefly are the lines of reasoning upon which is
founded the doctrine of the common law, that a "Contract in
restraint of trade is void as against public policy."
In proceeding to a general discussion of the merits and
demerits of the question which forms the subject of our inves-
tigation and research, we must constantly bear in mind that
the reasons above enunciated have been modified, as the laws
of trade have become better understood, as our commercial sys-
tem has been developed and by the enormous changes in our
social state. They had their origin in the dark ages when
the country was in a primitive state and to deprive a man of
the right to use his craft was to encourage idleness and ren-
der the person so restrained a dangerous member of society
when the avenues of industry were few ; and when, as in Ln-
gland, the people were forced to unite in combinations and
to exert their individual efforts in a common cause in order
that they might be able to withstand the powerful political
contrivances of William the Conqueror. The situation of
to-day and the outlook of the future is vastly different to
those barbarous times and call for new views and wider action.
"Steam, and electricity have for the purposes of trade and com-
merce almost annihilated distance and the whole world is now
a market for the distribution of the products of industry
the great diffusion of wealth and the reckless activity of
mankind striving to better, their condition have greatly en-
larged the field of hiuxan enterprise and created a vast num-
ber of new industries, which give scope to ingenuity and em-
ployment for capital and labor."
HISTORY
Among the most ancient rules of common law, we find it
laid down that bonds in restraint of trade are void. The
fact that the restraint was partial as to time or space had
no weight whatever when the contract restrained the industrial
or business freedom of the individual.
As early as the second year, of Henry V. (A.D., 1415) we
find by the year books, that this was considered old and set-
tied law. Through a succession of decisions, it has been
handed down to us, unquestioned till the present time. It
is true the general rule has from time to time been modified
and qualified, but the principle has always been regarded
as salutary.
For two hundred years the rule continued unchanged and
without exceptions. Then an attempt was made to qualify it
by setting up a distinction between sealed instruments and
simple contracts. But this could not be sustained upon any
sound principle. A different distinction was then started,
between a general and a limited restraint of trade, which
has been adhered to down to the present day.
In the great and leading case on this subject, Mitchell
vs. Reynolds reported in 1 P. Wims, 181, the distinction be-
tween contracts under seal, and not under seal was finally
exploded and the distinction between limited and general re-
straints fully established. The court enriched by deep
learning and indefatigable research entered into an elaborate
and exhaustive discussion of all contracts in restrain of
trade. Ever since that decision contracts in restraint of
trade generally have been held to be void while those limited
as to time, space, or persons have been regarded as valid and
duly enforced. Whether these exceptions to the general
rule were wise and have really improved it, some may doubt,
but it has been too long settled to be called in question.
GENERAL RESTRAINTS
A general restraint of trade cannot be defined with any
degree of accuracy as it will vary according to the peculiar
circurnstances of each case. For the purpose of this discus-
sion it may be said to be "such a restraint as prohibits a
person from employing his talents, industry or capital in any
undertaking within the country."
The general rule of law was laid down by Lord U-accles-
field in the standard case of Mitchell vs. Reynolds(refer-
red to in the introduction) that all contracts whether parol
or under seal, whether by bond, covenant, or promise, with or
without consideration, which are in general restraint of trad
or of any particular avocation or profession are absolutely
void, because they are against public policy and oppressive
on individual industry.
The rule probably arose from the fact that nobody con-
ceived in those days that a restraint extending over the
whole kingdom could be reasonable. Certainly it is no won-
der that judges of former times did not foresee that the dis-
coveries of science and the practical results of these dis-
coveries might in time prove general restraints in some cases
to be reasonable.
A very noticeable move toward relaxation was commenced
by the case of Roussillon v. Roussillon, 14 Ch. D.351, which
has been endorsed and followed by the later cases of Badische
Anilin &c. Fabrik v. Schott (1892, 3 Ch. 447) and Maxim Nor-
denfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. v. Nordenfelt (1893 Chan.630).
The case of Roussillon v. Roussillon extends the territory
over which a contract in restraint of trade may extend fur-
ther than any American case which has been reported on the
subject. In this case more than any other, ancient or modern
is distinctly brought out the true ground upon which contracts
in restraint of trade are declared void, that is, that under
the particular circumstances of each case, and the nature of
the particular contract involved in that case, the contract
must be unreasonable. In determining that question of reasor+
ableness or unreasonableness,the extent of the territory
covered by the prohibition is one element and only one element
in arriving at the conclusion. Some cases seem to have made
this the final and conclusive test, without any regard to the
nature of the contract or whether the public would or would
not suffer any inconvenience or detriment if the contract
should be enforced. On the other hand, it seems more reason-
able to consider the question o area as only a subordinate
and not a dominant consideration ; and that while some con-
tracts might be void, because unreasonable, if the terri-
tory covered by them were small, other contracts of an entire-
ly different nature might be valid even if a much larger area
was included. It depends or should depend upon the nature
of the business and whether such business could be done
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throughout a large area by one occupying a central position
therein ; or whether such business must from its very nature
be limited to a circumscribed locality. In the latter case
a contract might be void when embracing a much smaller terri-
tory than in the former.
In the American case of the Diamond ] atch Co. v. Roeber
106 N. Y. 473, Andrews J. although not called upon to dispose
of the case upon the grounds of general restraint, neverthe-
less strikes the key note to the situation and by a masterly
treatment of the question substantiates the logic and equity
of the line of reasoning as set forth in Roussillon v. Rous-
sil]on. Another leading Ar.,erican authority to the same pur-
port is that of Beal v. Beal reported in 31 Mich. 491.
The rule to be deduced seems to be this. The extent of
a valid restriction depends much upon the nature of the busi-
ness involved in the contract. If that be local, limited in
its extent, confined to a narrow circle, the extent of the
prohibition should be limited also ; if the business is far
reaching, capable of being carried on by the same party
through a large territory, like an express or carrier busi-
ness, telegraph lines, publishing of books, etc., the prohi-
bition may be co-extensive with the business. This flexible
rule will always carry out the object of the rule itself,
that is, protection to the promisee in his lawful possible
business, and protection to the public against inconvenience
or suffering for want of such trade or business in the neigh-
borhood or vicinity.
EXCEPTIONS
To the doctrine respecting contracts in restraint of
trade, as above set forth, there have been ingrafted a few
natable exceptions and in respect to which, the doctrine is
said to have no application:--
(1) Contracts involving a trade secret.
It is settled law that a secret art is a legal subject
of property ; and a bond for the exclusive right to it is not
open to the objection of being in restraint of trade, but may
be enforced by action at law, and requires the obligor not to
divulge the secret to any other person. In the case of
Vickery v. Welch, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 523, the action was upon a
bond ; the condition of the bond being that the defendant
would before September 1, 1836 convey to the plaintiff the
Welch chocolate mills, together with his exclusive right and
art or secret manner of raking chocolate. The defendant
refused to make the conveyance and when sued upon the bond
contended that this obligation was void as being in restraint
of trade. Per curiam, "We cannot suppose the case comes
within that doctrine. The defendant claims to operate a
secret art. The public are not prejudiced by the transfer
of it to the plaintiff. If it were worth anything the defend.
ant would use the art and keep it secret, and it is of no
consequence to the public whether the secret art be used by
the plaintiff or the defendant. For authorities see
Peabody v. Norfolk (98 Mass. 452).
(2) Contracts involving a business protected by a tent.
In the case of the Morse Twist Drill and Machine Co. v.
Stephen A. Morse 103 Mass. 73, the defendant sold to the
plaintiff two patents and agreed not to compete with him.
Defendant was also engaged to serve as superintendent of the
company for a term of three years beginning July 1, 1864,
and covenanted to devote his whole time and efforts for build-
ing up the business of the company. In consideration of
these covenants, the company agreed to pay him five thousand
dollars in thirty days ; five thousand dollars more out of the
net earnings and profits of the business after paying certain
dividends ; and fifteen hundred dollars per year for a term
of three years, payable monthly.
After the coz, pany had been running for a time, the defend
ant resigned and entered into the manufacture of the same
patents elsewhere ; but sold them in the same market in compe-
tition with the plaintiff at reduced prices. To a bill in
equity by the plaintiff to obtain an injunction the defendant
demurred, upon the alleged ground that his covenants were in
restraint of trade, contrary to public policy, and void, and
that as such he had a legal right to avoid them. The court
10
held that the doctrine had never been extended to a business
protected by a patent. The restriction in the sale of a
patent though extending through the whole country is ob-
viously no greater than the interest of the vendee requires;
and by giving it, the vendor has been able to obtain an en-
hanced price for what he sold.
(3) Contracts involving the sale of periodicals.
In Ainsworth v. Bentley, 14 Weekly Rep. 630, the plain-
tiff had in 1851 purchased of the defendant "Bentley's MTis-
cellany", which was then an established iagazine. He took
an agreement that the defendant would not publish another
periodical of a like nature. In 1865 the defendant entered
into an arrangement to become the publisher of the "Templer
Bar", a periodical of like nature and within the restriction.
It was objected that the agreement was void being in restraint
of trade and unlimited, and that magazine publishing was a
trade of itself. But Vice Chancellor Wood granted an in-
junction against violating the contract.
In Ingram v. Stiff, 5 Jur.(New Series) 947, a weekly
periodical was sold, coupled with an agreement by the vendor
not to publish, either alone or in partnership, any other
,eriodical of a nature similar to it. This agreement was
held to be valid and was enforced by injunction. It was held
that the restraint was not greater, having regard to the sub-
ject matter of the contract,than was necessary for the pro-
tection of the purchaser.
In this country, there are periodical publicaAons that
have a very wide circulation ; and it is obvious that a pur -
chaser of the proprietorship cannot afford to pay the full
value, unless he can obtain from the vendor a valid restric-
tion against competition, which restriction shall be extensive
as his interest requires, though it may cover the whole of a
state, or the whole country. The same would be true of
some books; e.g. the author of a popular school book could
not sell its proprietorship for its full value, unless he
could bind himself not to prepare another book which should
be used in competition with it.
(4) Extraterritorial trade contracts.
In Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Tass. 522, the defendant for
valuable consideration, covenanted that he would not be, di-
rectly or indirectly, interested in any voyage to the north-
west coast of America, or in any traffic with the natives of
that coast, for seven years ;but failed to stand by his coven-
ant. It was argued in his favor that the covenant was void
as being in restraint of trade. Per curiam, "The princi-
ple relied on does not apply to this case. This is a trade
but lately discovered and it can be beneficial but to a small
number of adventurers. If one adventurer will engage to re-
tire from it for a valuable consideration, and leave the con-
12
duct of it to others, it is lawful for him to do so, and
his contract to that effect will be binding on him. Instead
of an injury to the public, the community may receive a bene-
fit from such a procedure, as it will go to prevent the trades
being overdone, and so becoming profitable to none.
PARTIAL OR LI17ITED RESTRAINTS
The leading American authority Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio
State 519, holds that to render a contract in restraint of
trade valid it must appear :-
I. THAT THE RESTRAINT IS PARTIAL.
I. THAT IT IS FOUNDED UPON Al ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION.
III. THAT IT IS REASONABLE AND NOT OPPRESSIVE.
I. PARTIAL RESTRAINTS.
The definition of a contract in partial restraint
of trade, has been said by the court in Horner v. Ashford,
3 Bing. 328, to be "one which limits an individual to or ex-
cludes him from a circumscribed district in the employment of
his industry, talents or capital". Chitty in his work on
contracts has declared it to be a "restraint subject to some
qualification as to time or space". Strictly speaking, how-
ever, neither of these definitions are accurate. A more
satisfactory classification is that adopted by the learned
English Barrister William Arnold Jolly. He divides partial
restraints into
A. Restraints particular as to places.
B. Restraints particular as to persons.
C. Restraints as to the mode or manner in which the trade
is to be carried on.
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A. Any contracts which restrains the business or indus-
trial freedom within reasonable limits as to space, is partial
This doctrine was upheld in the standard case of T'itchell V.
Reynolds and has been supported by a large number of similar
cases. A few illustrations may be opportune.
A physician agrees with B not to practice within twenty
miles of B's residence. The agreement is valid.
Butler v. Burleson 16 Vt.176.
A sells out his farming mill business to B, covenanting
not to carry on the same business south of the Wabash River,
within thirty miles of Marion, Indiana.
Bowser v. Bliss,7 Blackf. (Ind.)344.
A covenant not to carry on the business of soap and ashec
manufacturer for ten years within forty miles of Lockport,
N.Y. Ross v. Sadgbeer,21 Wendell 166.
Not to practice law within six miles of Chili, Ill.
Linn v. Sigbee, 67 Illinois 75.
Not to practice medicine within ten miles of Litchfield,
Conn. Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175.
McClure's Appeal 58 Pa.St. 51.
Bigony v. Tyson,75 Pa.St.157.
The reasons why partial restraints as to space are held
valid, are obvious. When a limit of space is imposed, the
public, on the one hand do not lose altogether the services
of the party in the particular trade ; he will carry it on
in the same way elsewhere; nor within the limited space will
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they be deprived of the benefits of the trade, because the
party with whom the contract is made will probably, within
those limits, exercise it himself. But where a general
restriction limited only as to time is imposed, the public
are altogether losers, for that time, of the services of the
individual and do not derive any benefit in return.
B. 1. The second kind of partial restraints is where,
although the restriction is not limited as to space, the
contract leaves the covenantor the right to trade with par-
ticular persons.
In the case of Gale v. Reed, 8 East 83, the defendant
covenanted during his life to employ exclusively the plain-
tiffs to make all cordage for the defendant, and for his
friends and connections whom the plaintiff could trust.
This was held to be partial because the defendant was still
at liberty to supply such of his friends and connections as
the plaintiffs did not trust.
2. Again where one party agrees to employ another in the
way of his trade and the other undertakes to work exclusively
for him, that is a partial restraint of trade.
Thus in the case of Wallace v. Day, 2 M.and W., 273, the
plaintiff Wallace covenanted to serve the defendant as an
assistant in the trade of a carrier and that he would not
thenceforth exercise the trade of a carrier except as such
assistant. This was held to be a valid agree-,ent, Lord Abin-
ger saying, "It cannot be said to be a contract in absolute
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restraint of trade when a fman contracts to serve another for
his life in some trade.
Young v. Timmins, 1 Tyrrwh 226.
Hartley v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 260.
Whittle v. Frankland, 2 B. & S. 49.
Regina v. Welch, 2 Q.B. 357.
In America, however, the policy of the law requires labor
to be unrestricted, and were it not so it might be a serious
question whether the enforcement of the agreement to labor
permanently and exclusively for a particular person, at his
absolute dictation, is not in conflict with that clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, which prohibits involuntary servitude. If an agree-
ment to labor permanently and exclusively for a particular
person, without discrimination as to the line of labor, is
valid and can be enforced, then an agreement for life service
can be enforced. Hence a special engagement to work for a
particular employer for a particular time will be sustained,
but not a permanent and exclusive transfer of services.
3. Another instance of a contract in restraint of trade
particular as to persons is where one trader covenants not to
supply or deal with the customers of another in a particular
trade.
Clearly this is not a general restraint for the covenant-
or is at liberty to trade with all the world, with the excep-
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tion of a limited number of persons. Such a provision fre-
quently occurs in a device of realty, where the devisee is
restrained by the provisions of the will from having any deal-
ings whatever with certain specified persons, and such condi-
tions by the general weight of authority, controverts no rule
of public policy and is binding upon the devisee. See Hutch-
in's Notes to Williams on Real Property, p. 94. It is neces-
sary that the persons with whom intercourse is prohibited
should be in each case ascertained for were it otherwise
the courts would be unable to decide whether the restriction
,aas partial or not.
C. The only reported English case which seems to properly
come under this head is Jones v. Lees, I H. and N. 169. In
that case the covenantor agreed not to manufacture stubbing
machines without applying to them an invention patented by the
covenantee. Lord Bowen declared that inasmuch as it merely
regulates or confines the manner in which the trade is to be
worked, Jt is a partial restraint.
Although the American authorities on this point are com-
paratively few, nevertheless the rule is recognized and sanc-
tioned. Thus in the case of the N.Y. Bank Note Co. v. Hamil-
ton Bank Note Engraving and Printing Co. reported in 83 Hun.
593, an agreement by a manufacturer of printing presses not to
sell any presses, which could be used for certain kinds of
printing was held to be valid.
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This same line of reasoning is set forth in those cases
where adjoining land owners mutuallyr agree to use their lands
in a certain specified 1anner and such equitable liens are
held valid and binding. Trustees of Coluybia College v.Lynch,
70 N. Y., 440, and also cases collected in Hutchins' Notes
to Williams on Real Property, page 97.
II. ADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION.
The contract in restrain of trade must be founded
upon an adequate consideration. Lord Ellenborough says,
"The restraint on the one side meant to be enforced should
in reason be co-oxtensive only with the benefit to be enjoyed
on the other."
A. Who determines the adequacy of the consideration ?
The decisions of the English Court are to the effect
that the adequacy of the consideration will not be inquired
into, and the parties must act on their own idea as to its
sufficiency. So with the American authorities, the question
whether or not the consideration for such restraint is adequate
or inadequate is one into which the courts will not inquire.
Where a consideration recognized in law as being valuable,
is paid, the law presumes that the matter has been deliberate-
ly considered by the parties to the transaction and that it is
commensurate with the restraint imposed. An apt illustra-
tion is brought out in the case of Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass.
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223. The court thought the contract to be a reasonable one
and the consideration of one dollar having been fixed and
adopted by the parties as adequate, accepted the same as suf-
ficient in law.
B. Seal as a consideration.
According to the law of contract generally the seal im-
ports a valid consideration. This rule,of law, however, not
only loses its force but has no application whatever to con-
tracts in restraint of trade. This may at first seem to
be a great innovation upon a well established principle of
law, but when we take into consideration the reason upon
which it is based we cannot doubt but that it is founded upon
just and equitable ground. As said by Park B. in Wash v.
Day 2 M. and W. 277, "the consideration in this class of
contracts is required for a different reason from that in
the ordinary contract, viz. that here it would be unreasonable
for a man to enter into such a stipulation without some con-
sideration though it must be left to his own judgment to de-
termine the amount and nature thereof.
C. Good will as a consideration.
The transfer of the good will of one's business may be
the inducement on which the vendee makes the purchase and
this may be shown by the vendee as a consideration in support
of a contract in limited restraint of trade.
Gilman v. Dwight,13 Gray 356.
Boutelle v. Smith,116 Mass. 111.
Tvlott v. Mott, 11 Barb. 127.
III. IT MUST BE REASONABLE.
A. It is not sufficient that the restraint be
partial and founded upon consideration. The agreement must
be reasonable. As to what shall be deemed a reasonable
limitation, there is, and from the nature of things can be,
no definite rule. No precise boundary can be laid down
within which the restraint would be reasonable, and beyond
which it would be unreasonable. It must ] depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case, and the good sense and
sound discretion of the tribunal which may have the case to
settle.
The test as laid down by Tindal C.J. in Horner v. Graves,
7 Bing- 743 and approved of by all the subsequent cases down
to the present time, is"whether the restraint is such only as
to afford a fair protection to the interest of the party in
favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere
with the interests of the public."
B. It is said that when the limitation is only colora-
ble or unreasonable, it falls within the rule and not the ex-
ceptior and is therefore void. Homer v.Graves,7 Bing. 735.
C. Where the restraint is larger than that required for
the protection of the party in interest, it will be declared
void. 3 Ohio Law Journal,647.
D. If the contract be reasonable as to locality, indefi-
niteness as to conditions and duration will not invalidate.it.
3 Ohio Law Journal, 648.
E. Does the cessation of business on the part of the
covenantee relieve the covenantor from the obligations of the
agreement ?
The early case of Elves v. Croft, 10 C.B. 241 holds that
the fact that the plaintiff has quit the trade and no longer
needs protection, makes no difference in an action on the
bond and will not relieve from the original contract. So in
the case of Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175, the court says :
"The rule as to the contract is that if it is reasonable
when made, subsequent circumstances, such as the fact of the
covenantee ceasing business so as to no longer need the pro-
tection, do not affect its operation." A contrary doctrine
is maintained by the supreme court of Iowa in the case of
Heichew v. Hamilton, 49 Greene 317 and later in the case of
Berger and Yeiser v. Armstrong, 41 Iowa 450, and is supported
by the greater weight of authority and the reasons of justice
and sound policy. In the latter case the court per Miller
C.J., say : "It is not shown that the plaintiffs at the com-
mencement of this proceeding, or at the time of moving for an
injunction, were themselves engaged in or carrying on the
drug business in the town of Toledo, nor does it state other
facts showing that they had any longer a right to insist upon
an observance of the contract on the part of the defendant.
The quity of this view is manifest, for can it be said that
to enforce a contract of this kind, after the plaintiff has
ceased to need the protection and quit the business, is sound
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in policy or within the spirit of the contract ? Such a de-
cision as Elves v. Croft is contrary to public policy, wrong
in principle and against the weight of authority.
1,ISCELIANEOUS POINTS.
I. PRESUMPTIONS. III. DIVISIBILITY.
II. ASSIGNABILITY. IV. REMEDIES.
I. PRESUMPTIONS--
In all contracts in restraint of trade where nothing
more appears, the law presume them bad, thus casting the bur-
den of establishing their validity upon the person seeking
their enforcement.
Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co.68 Pa.St.173.
Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wendell 157.
If, however, the circumstances of the transaction are
set forth, that presumption is excluded and the court is to
judge of those circumstances and determine accordingly.
If it is capable of construction which will render it valid,
it is to be so construed.
lorillard v. Clyde, 86 N.Y. 384.
Where the circumstances of the transaction are not set
forth, thus establishing the presumption of invalidity, it is
always a question of law for the court to determine whether
such 2ersumption has been overcome, and should never be sub-
mitted to a jury.
Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735.
II. ASSIGNABILITYT-
There is a general proposition of law to the effect that
personal contracts and penalties for torts are not capable of
passing by assignment. The action is personal. The real
party in interest must sue. Some of the courts have erron-
eously applied this doctrine to covenants in restraint of
trade. The covenant in restraint of trade, however, does not
attach to the covenantee personally, but only as an incident
to the business. It cannot exist in his favor after he has
ceased to require its protection. In whose favor does it ex-
ist ? Certainly if it exists at all it exists in favor of
his successor who has by the assignment acquired his interest
in the business. To reason otherwise would be fallacy.
California Steam Navigation Co. v. Wright, 6 Cal.258.
Butler v. Burleson, 16 Vermont, 175.
III. DIVISIBILITY--
A contract may sometimes be valid in part and invalid in
other particulars. As a general rule where a promise is made
for one entire consideration, a part of which is fraudulent,
immoral or unlawful, and the provisions as a whole are so
connected in subject matter, depending on each other, operat-
ing together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected
in meaning as to be incapable of being severed, then the
whole promise fails. But if there are several independent
promises depending upon several distinct and corresponding
24
considerations, the fact that the consideration upon which
one of the promises is based is invalid, does not necessari-
ly affect or destroy the validity and efficacy of the others.
Each promise with its corresponding consideration forms one
entire and independent transaction in itself, and if made in
compliance with the principles of law, will be recognized and
enforced, notwithstanding the fact that a similar promise
based upon an invalid consideration, which joined with it as
a link in the chain of one entire transaction, falls to the
ground for want of legal support.
Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469.
IV. REEDIES--
1. Action for damages.
It is often a doubtful question whether the sum
stipulated to be paid on the non-performance of a condition
is in the nature of a penalty, or is the amount settled upon
by the parties for the purpose of making that certain which
would otherwise be uncertain. It must rest upon the constru-
tion to be given to the language used, aided by the facts
proved, which gave birth to the instrument. In the ordinary
contract the court is very apt to consider it as a penalty
if the jury can, without great difficulty, decide approximate-
ly the amount of damage which the aggrieved party has sustain-
ed. But in contracts and restraint of trade the courts are
very reluctant and rarely interfere with the amounts which
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the parties have agreed upon as damages. This is due to the
fact that the parties themselves have better means of knowl-
edge and can with a greater degree of certainty, determine
what damages will be a sufficient recompense for the injury
sustained than a jury, from their limited source of informa-
tion, can possibly hope to ascertain.
2. Injunction.
A court of equity, in a proper case, will by an
injunction enjoin the covenantor from violating the terms
of the contract. As in all actions, equity will grant this
relief only in those cases where there is no adequate and
complete remedy at law, and that a breach of the contract,
either actual or threatened has taken place.
Dwight v. Hamilton, 113 Mass. 175.
CONCLUSION
Actuated by a desire to keep the extent of this discus-
sion within reasonable limits, and to present briefly and con-
cisely the more important and salutary phases of the subject,
the writer has been obliged to disregard and cast aside much
of the substance which would tend to give the main structure
a more thorough and polished finish.
The very interesting subject of"combinations into which
our present discussion frequently tempts us, forms in itself
a question too extended for proper discussion here.
Involuntary restraints, as those imposed by grants, cus-
toms and by-laws have been dispensed with, not so much for
the reason of time required for their treatment as to their
impracticability.
The voluntary restraints, or those imposed upon the par-
ties of their own free will, are those with which we have been
chiefly concerned, and both from historical and practical
standpoints afforded an interesting and pleasant research.
As to the present status of the law on this subject,
little may be added by way of conclusion to what has already
been said. At the early common law these contracts diminish-
ed the means of supporting the family, tended to deprive the
public of the services of useful men, discouraged industry,
diminished productions, prevented competition and enhanced
prices. The effect of these contracts at the present time
are too well understood to require assertion here. We
have emerged from that semi-civilized state and there is no
evidence that contracts in restraint of trade under the heal-
thy regulations to which they are now required to conform,
work any public mischief and the contract is not one of such
a nature that it tends to deprive men of employment, and un-
duly raise prices or put an end to competition.
There is one thing very evident and that is that the
idea public policy as it prevails throughout these contracts
has today lost its force and application. The fear of pauper-
ism arising from the restraint imposed upon the individual
is somewhat absurd. There is another reason why the element
of public policy should be discarded. To determine what is
and what is not prejudicial to the interests of trade, re-
quires an exceptional insight into economic conditions and the
nature of commercial transactions, and is a task to which
few judges may with any degree of propriety or hope of success
apply themselves. Public policy has been termed an "unruly
horse" and if I may be pardoned for polishing the simile, I
would say,let us not enter him in the race of contracts in
restraint of trade. He has no standing there. He might in
the wilderness of some boundless prairie prove to be a steed
worthy of his metal, but in the refined race track which mod-
ern civilization has erected for trade, he is neither useful
nor ornamental but a menace to all.
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